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Abstract
All warfare contains and element of randomness. This article will argue
that, the kind uncertainty encountered in cyber warfare (Power-Law
randomness) is fundamentally different from the uncertainty the military
has evolved to deal with in the physical world (Gaussian-Randomness).
The article will explain the difference between these two kinds of
randomness, and how cyber weapons appear to operate under Power-
Law randomness. It then will show how in cyberspace, key aspects of
strategic thought are based on a flaws assumption of randomness.
Finally, this article shall argue that if the American military is going to be
effective in cyberspace, it must re-examine the way the military assumes
risk, recruits is forces, plans for war and maintains the peace.
This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security:
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol8/iss4/3
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Introduction 
This article deals with the unique uncertainty encountered in the cyber 
domain.  Uncertainty in warfare is nothing new. Clausewitz once famously 
wrote that: 
 
“War is the province of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on 
which action in war is based are wrapped in a cloud of greater or lesser 
uncertainty.  Here, then, above all a fine and penetrating mind is called 
for, to search out the truth by the tact of its judgment.”1 
 
Good officers make plans knowing full well that the unexpected will happen 
and that they will have to adapt and change in the face of this uncertainty.  As 
von Moltke said, “No plan survives contact with the enemy.”2  But good 
officers try to account for this uncertainty and figure out both what is possible 
and what is likely.  This article will argue that assumptions about randomness 
in physical warfare do not apply to the cyber domain.  Within information 
systems, the randomness encountered is different than the randomness 
normally encountered in the physical world.  This creates the situation that, 
without a deliberate mental effort, an officer in the cyber domain will be 
inclined to make assumptions that are ill-suited to the battlefield on which he 
fights.  Finally, this article will explore assumptions based on the physical 
world that should be re-examined for the cyber domain. 
 
Two Kinds of Randomness 
“The Die is Cast”  
– Julius Caesar, as he led his army across the Ruibcon 
 
Since ancient times, generals have linked warfare with the roll of a dice.  By 
the mid-1800s, some of the first war games included dice to simulate the 
element of randomness in war.3  This choice worked because it mimicked the 
kind of randomness we frequently encounter on the battlefield.  Throw a large 
number of dice, add up their values and plot the result and you will get a bell 
curve.  Gaussian randomness describes the variations in physical strength, 
speed, and agility our ancestors would have encountered in the African 
savannah and later on the battlefield.  Intuitively, people know that there is a 
                                                     
1 Clausewitz, Carl von, and Frederic N. Maude, On War (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, 
Trübner & Co LTD, 1908), 48. 
2 Barnett, Correlli, The Swordbearers (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1963), 35. 
3 Ewalt, David M, Of Dice and Men (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2013), 97. 
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typical height, weight, strength, and speed for the humans, predators, and 
prey we find in our environment.  Of course, we encounter deviations from 
this norm, but our brains know how to accept and understand these realities.  
Sometimes we see a large deviation from the norm, but as both generals and 
casino operators know, under Gaussian randomness with enough rolls of the 
dice things tend to “average out.” 
  
Recently however, many scientists have begun to observe a different kind of 
randomness that governs many of the phenomena in our high-tech world: the 
Power-Law.4  The Power-Law can also be demonstrated by rolling dice, but 
we have to play a different game.  Roll a dice.  If the result is odd, the game is 
over and you score no points.  If the result is even, you earn one point and can 
roll again.  Every time from then on that you roll an even number, double 
your points and roll again.  The game ends once you roll an odd number.  In 
this game, half of the people will end up with nothing and a few very lucky 
people will finish with a large score.  To understand a bell curve you must 
discover where the bell is centered (the average) and the width of the bell (the 
standard deviation).  To understand a Power-Law, you must note what is 
happening on the extremes.  Power-Law distributions are a general case of the 
“80-20” rule, where 80 percent of the impact comes from 20 percent of a 
population.  One of the signatures of a Power-Law distribution is that if you 
plot it on a Log-Log scale, the result should be a straight line.  Figure 1 shows 
a Power-Law versus a normal distribution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
4 Barabási, Albert-László, and Jennifer Frangos. Linked (New York: Basic Books, 2002);, 
Albert-László Barabási, Bursts (New York: Penguin, 2010); Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The 
Black Swan (New York: Random House LLC, 2007); Steven Pinker,  The Better Angels of 
Our Nature (New York: Penguin, 2011). 
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Figure 1: Comparison of Random Distributions 
Music sales, monetary wealth and book sales are all common areas of 
everyday life that follow a Power-Law distribution.5  Most professionals in the 
music industry ignore what is happening with the “average” artist and instead 
concentrate on what is happening at the top of the charts.  Select a 
professional musician at random and the odds are that the artist has only 
managed to sell a few copies of his/her works.  However, within the pool of 
professional musicians are a few who are able to sell millions of albums. 
Despite thousands of artist working in the industry, only a small handful truly 
shape it.  This is not the case with a plumber, dentist or carpenter.  In these 
professions, the income distribution looks more like a bell curve.  The reason 
that musicians, authors, and artists have such a variable income, whereas 
dentists, plumbers, and carpenters do not, is that the former work primarily 
with information whereas the later work primarily with physical entities. 
 
There are three other important differences that set the Power-Law 
distribution apart from Gaussian randomness.  The first is the difference in 
magnitude between an outlier and the average.  Under a bell curve 
distribution, an outlier can only deviate so far from the norm.  Out of roughly 
seven billion people, Sultan Kosen is currently the world’s tallest living man.6  
While being 8’3” is enormous, his height is only a factor of 1.5 times taller 
than an average sized adult male.  Under a bell curve, there comes a point 
where anything beyond that is astronomically rare.  In contrast, under a 
Power-Law distribution, it is common to see events that deviate from the 
norm by a factor of more than a thousand.  If, instead, people’s height 
(governed by a bell curve) were to correspond with their income (governed by 
a Power-Law), the earth would be populated with billions of midgets and a 
                                                     
5 Taleb, The Black Swan, 33. 
6 Guinness World Records. "Tallest man - living" February 9, 2011, available at: 
http://www.guinnessworldrecords.com/world-records/tallest-man-living. accessed: 
June 24, 2014. 
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handful of giant colossuses such as Bill Gates.  The presence of extreme 
variations from the norm is the first key to understanding a Power-Law 
distribution. 
 
The second key to understanding Power-Laws is that they arise from two 
factors: Growth and preferential attachment.7  Power-Laws occur on systems 
that are allowed to grow and change in a way that reinforces success.  Indeed, 
Power-Laws are a mathematical signature of evolution.8  Bill Gates’ fortune 
did not spring into being all at once.  Rather it grew with the success of 
Microsoft as more and more PC users chose the Microsoft operating systems 
and productivity tools. 
 
The third and final key to understanding Power-Laws is the difficulty in 
identifying which small advantages will become enormously consequential.  
In the popular television show American Idol, talented singers compete for a 
single record contract.  The show is a vivid example of a Power-Law 
distribution at work.  Thousands compete, but most receive nothing.  A few 
receive a trip to Hollywood and fewer still receive a small measure of fame.  
For one winner however, the rewards are enormous.  The entertainment of 
the show is derived in large part from the unpredictability of the outcome.  
Consider a record producer.  Even for a well-trained professional, accurately 
differentiating between singers who are in the 67.8th and 67.9th percentiles is 
very difficult.  Fortunately that task matters little.  However differentiating 
between who is in the 99.8th and 99.9th percentile (just as difficult) is 
extremely important because of the enormous differences in sales outcomes.   
 
For a more serious example, Stephen Pinker has noted that the casualty 
counts in war follow a Power-Law distribution.9  Most conflicts are relatively 
bloodless, but a few are absolutely devastating.  We shake our heads in 
disbelief at the picnickers who came to watch the first battles of the US Civil 
War, because they believed the rebels would be quickly crushed.  Likewise, all 
of the generals in the early days of World War I assumed that the conflict 
would end quickly.  But we miss the key point that under a Power-Law 
system, it is reasonable to assume that most wars are short and relatively 
bloodless.  The tragedy is that when events fall in just the right way, the 
outcome is very different.  Even worse, few will recognize it until it’s too late. 
 
                                                     
7 Barabási, Linked, 87. 
8 Ibid, 208. 
9 Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature, 218. 
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Multiple authors have shown that Cyberspace is full of Power-Laws.  The 
physical topology of links and nodes on the Internet follows a Power-Law 
distribution.10  The distribution of web page links also follows a Power-Law 
distribution.11  The propagation patterns of computer viruses are explained by 
Power-Law distributions.12   
 
This article argues that there is a deep and hidden assumption of Gaussian 
randomness that underlies much of our strategic thought.  However, within 
the cyber domain, a different kind of randomness dominates.  This 
observation demands that military professionals challenge some common 
assumptions as they prepare for and conduct war.  
 
Randomness and the Differences Between Cyber and Physical 
Weapons  
Imagine the best soldier living in the Roman Empire.  His superior strength, 
speed and agility place him six standard deviations above the norm: literally a 
one-in-a-million soldier.  Being mortal, his strength, speed, and agility are 
superior to his opponents, but as was discussed in the previous section, not 
astronomically so.  By himself the soldier could make a difference in the 
outcome of a small battle, but not a large campaign.  This is because his 
physical variations are governed a bellcurve distribution.  The Tofflers 
observed that we evaluate weapons by their range, speed, and lethality.13  
Technology can improve the range of a bullet or the lethal radius of a bomb, 
but even today, variances in these characteristics are still described with a 
bellcurve.  
 
Now imagine the impact that a one-in-a-million cyber warrior could have in a 
cyber conflict.  The impacts of cyber weapons (and by extension those who 
create them) seem to be governed by a Power-Law distribution.  In other 
words, most weapons will have little impact, but a few will be extremely 
consequential. 
Defining a Cyber Weapon 
In this article, a cyber weapon refers to a unique exploit or technique, but 
does not account for the number of copies in existence.  In the physical world, 
                                                     
10 Faloutsos, Michalis, Petros Faloutsos, and Christos Faloutsos. “On Power-Law 
Relationships of the Internet Topology,” SIGCOMM Computer Communications 29:4 
(1999): 251–62. 
11 Barabási, Linked, 66. 
12 Ibid, 133. 
13 Toffler, Alvin, War and Anti-War (New York: Little Brown & Company, 1993). 
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having ten identical copies of an aircraft carrier is roughly ten times better 
than having only one.14  But having ten identical copies of the same exploit 
would not be appreciably different that possessing a single copy.   
 
For purposes of this definition, a unique weapon may only be a small 
evolutionary change from an existing exploit.  Researchers have noted that 
the frequency of calls made to different software libraries follow a Power-Law 
distribution.15  What is striking is that the same pattern appears when 
biologists examine the distribution of known proteins to biological processes.  
In other words, software bears the same mathematical signature of evolution.  
This shouldn’t surprise anyone who has actually worked with software.  
Experience would suggest that exploits, just like other software, evolve as 
well.           
 
Cyber Weapon Effectiveness 
If the effectiveness of cyber weapons operated under a Power-Law 
distribution, we would expect that most weapons would impact only a small 
number of systems, but a few could exploit many hosts.16  Further, we would 
expect that small environmental factors, such as the structure of the network 
or the configuration of the target, would result in very different outcomes for 
similar exploits.  In addition, we expect that a small variation in the design of 
one cyber weapon might make a large but unexpected impact in its 
effectiveness. 
 
What we experience on the Internet squares with our expectations.  One 
example of the Power-Law phenomena in cyber warfare is computer viruses.  
Consider that on 18 June 2014, an “average” day, the Wild List17 reported only 
1,820 variations of malicious logic that have been observed “in the wild,” 
meaning they are actively propagating on real systems.  Yet an anti-virus 
scanner has signatures against hundreds of thousands of unique exploits.  
McAfee’s website reported discovering 30 new instances of malicious logic in 
a single day (June 23, 2014).  All of the instances were rated as a low threat.  
                                                     
14 Toffler, Alvin, and Heidi Toffler, Revolutionary Wealth (New York: Random House 
LLC, 2006), 100. 
15 Sergi Valverde, Ramon Ferrer Cancho, and Ricard V.Solé, "Scale-free Networks from 
Optimal Design," SFI Working Paper: 2002-04-019 (Santa Fe, NM: Santa Fe Institute, 
2002): 512-517, available at http://www.santafe.edu/media/workingpapers/02-04-
019.pdf. 
16 Taleb, The Black Swan, 206. 
17 WildList Organization International, “The Wildlist,” available at: 
http://www.wildlist.org/CurrentList.txt.  
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This is consistent with a Power-Law distribution.  Thousands of new viruses 
are constantly created every year.  Most are only seen once.  Only a few are 
ever observed in the wild and most of those cause little damage.   
 
Yet on the other extreme, consider the Conficker worms.  SAIC estimated that 
by March of 2009, Conficker.A had infected 4.7 million IP Addresses and 
Conficker.B had infected 6.4 million systems.  Confiker was an example of a 
piece of malicious logic that was serious enough to warrant an Infocon 
Yellow18 on the Internet Storm Center (Internet Storm Center, 2014).  
According to their history, an Infocon Yellow event occurs a little more than 
once a year.  An Infocon Orange19 event is even more rare, occurring briefly 
from the Code Red worm in 2001 and again from the Slammer worm in 2003.  
An Infocon Red event has never occurred since the Storm Center’s creation. 
 
The point of these examples is to show that malicious logic strongly exhibits 
the characteristics one would expect under a Power-Law distribution.  Most 
new cyber weapons do next to nothing, while a few have an enormous impact.  
This might create a tempting target for budget cutters except for one small 
problem: We cannot predict the effectiveness of cyber weapons.  
 
Predicting the effectiveness of cyber weapons 
Because the effectiveness of a cyber weapon is contingent on so many 
variables, it is virtually impossible to predict the effectiveness a-priori.  When 
Robert Morris created the Morris Worm in 1988,20 he had no idea that it 
would impact the Internet as severely as it did.  Likewise when David L. Smith 
created the Melissa virus he had no idea it would cause a global impact.21  In 
both cases, the authors had placed controls to limit the spread of their attacks, 
and in both cases the exploits unexpectedly overwhelmed their control 
systems.  
 
The phenomenon of unpredictability is a feature of Power-Law distributions.  
At the extreme, a tiny variation can have a huge difference in outcomes.22  But 
                                                     
18 Infocon Yellow is an event where “impact is either unknown or expected to be minor to 
the infrastructure. However, local impact could be significant.” 
19 Infocon Orange is as “a major disruption in connectivity is imminent or in progress.” 
20 Eugene H. Spafford, “The Internet Worm Program: an Analysis,” Purdue Technical 
Report CSD-TR-823 (West Lafayette: Purdue University, November 2, 1988), available 
at: http://spaf.cerias.purdue.edu/tech-reps/823.pdf. 
21 Ronald B. Standler, “Examples of Malicious Computer Programs,” October 5, 2002, 
available at: http://www.rbs2.com/cvirus.htm. 
22 Taleb, The Black Swan, 232. 
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observing tiny variations is, by definition, difficult.  The Power-Law 
randomness of a cyber weapon arises in part because its performance is 
dependent on its “fitness” to the environment at the time.  Since the cyber 
environment is complex and constantly changing, cyber warriors cannot know 
for sure how it will perform with certainty until they actually use it. 
 
Thus the mindset of employing cyber weapons must be radically different 
than the mindset of a soldier employing weapons in the physical world.  The 
soldier takes it for granted that the way a bullet interacts with armor or flesh 
is consistent and predictable.  Of course, sometimes that soldier might 
encounter a lucky shot or a dud.  But these considerations do not affect how a 
soldier employs his weapon.  On the other hand, a cyber warrior must 
constantly be aware that the environment is in flux.  Systems are constantly 
being patched and upgraded and users are constantly adding and removing 
systems and applications from their network.  What was an effective attack 
today could be rendered useless tomorrow. 
 
The Challenges of Randomness in Cyberspace To Strategic 
Thought 
Consider once again the one-in-a-million super soldier.  In the world of the 
bell curve, even great soldiers must exist within the realm of human abilities.  
A wise general may be thankful to possess such a gifted soldier, but he 
understands that the success of his army ultimately rests on the collective 
efforts of a host of average soldiers.  The Red Baron may be useful as a source 
of propaganda, but the overall progress of the air campaign will be 
determined in the end by the total effort of average pilots. 
 
With Power-Law weapons, it is the extremes that make the greatest 
contributions. A one-in-a-million cyber warrior could create a cyber weapon 
more impacting than the efforts of a small army of “average” cyber warriors.  
The problem that faces us today is that our military and law-enforcement 
structures are designed specifically for a world of averages.  The following 
examples show some of the ways that “bell curve thinking” has shaped well-
established military assumptions. 
 
Cyberspace’s Challenge to Sun Tzu 
Consider Sun Tzu’s most famous dictum: 
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“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the 
result of a hundred battles.”23 
 
How do cyber warriors know their adversary in cyberspace?  For that matter, 
how do they know themselves?  We have already argued that in a Power-Law 
system, the extremes have a significant impact, but identifying who is in the 
extremes ahead of time is virtually impossible.  Thus, perhaps the most 
consequential question in cyber warfare is: “How do we measure the power of 
a cyber army?”  Notice the hidden assumption Sun Tzu makes when he 
offered the following counsel:  
 
“It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy's one, to 
surround him; if five to one, to attack him; if twice as numerous, to 
divide our army into two. If equally matched, we can offer battle; if 
slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; if quite unequal 
in every way, we can flee from him.”24 
 
For Sun Tzu, measuring power is achieved simply be counting average bodies.  
This works in the world of the bell curve where the extremes average out.  In 
the world of the Power-Law, it falls apart.  For example, consider one 
publishing company with 1,000 randomly chosen authors and another 
publishing company with just one: J.K. Rowling.  Who will sell more books?  
In cyberspace, as in all Power-Law systems, you cannot accurately estimate 
power with a simple census.  You could make a quality assessment about the 
cyber forces you possess.  However, as stated before, differentiating between 
the top .1% and top .001% is nearly impossible, but in a Power-Law system 
extremely consequential. 
 
Cyberspace’s Challenge to Understanding the Terrain  
No rational commander would go into battle without an understanding of the 
terrain.  Yet in cyberspace, a usable map is hard to come by.  Figure 2 is a map 
of the Internet produced in 2011.25   
 
Figure 2: Map of the Internet.  Each view focuses on a narrower 
portion of the Internet, but the Power-Law nature is evident 
throughout. 
                                                     
23 Sun, Tzu, The Art of War trans. Lionel Giles (Singapore: Graham Brash (Pte) Ltd., 
1993), Section 3.18. 
24 Ibid. Sec 3.8-9. 
25 Enikeev, Ruslan, "The Internet Map" 2011, available at: http://internet-map.net. 
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The map looks like a collection of fireworks and at first glance does not 
appear very useful.  Yet those fireworks are a visual representation of a 
Power-Law Distribution.  The centers of the bursts are the extreme ends of 
the distribution, and the edges of the bursts are the more common nodes.  A 
wise commander should recognize that the centers of the bursts are the key 
landmarks of the battlefield.  There is no escaping this reality.  As noted 
earlier, this pattern appears at various levels of abstraction (such as the 
interconnection of the physical systems that comprise the internet and the 
networks of hyperlinks that comprise the world-wide web).  In addition, a 
Power-Law distribution is sometimes referred to as a Scale-Free distribution.  
Whether one is looking at a map of the entire Internet, or the network of a 
country or even a single military base, the firework pattern will appear over 
and over again.  A wise commander will understand this feature of the cyber 
battle space.  
 
Cyberspace’s Challenge To The Law of Armed Conflict  
There are three governing principles in the Law of Armed Conflict: Military 
Necessity, Distinction, and Proportionality.  Of these, Proportionality is the 
most at risk.  Proportionality requires a commander to “refrain from deciding 
to launch any attack… which would be excessive in relation to the concrete 
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and direct military advantage anticipated”.26  If the effectiveness of a cyber 
weapon can vary greatly and cannot be known a-priori, then Proportionality 
is almost impossible to reliably achieve with a cyber weapon.  Nations might 
attempt to place controls that would limit the effectiveness of a cyber weapon.  
However, both the previously mentioned Morris worm and Melissa virus 
contained such limiting controls.  The reality is that these weapons are often 
created in secret and tested on small, isolated ranges.  Once employed in the 
real world, there is a small chance that the weapon could become significantly 
more impacting than anticipated.  Would the international community judge 
such an event by the attempt at control or the result? 
 
Cyberspace’s Challenge to Recruiting 
In the physical world, governments can reliably convert tax revenues into 
quantities of well-equipped police officers and soldiers.  The greater the 
disparity between the resources a government invests and a potential 
adversary, the greater the likelihood the government will prevail.  This works 
because the government only needs to find an average soldier or police 
officer.  Spending more money on an army can result in proportionately more 
power.  With cyberspace, the challenge is to focus on quality more than 
quantity.  Simply recruiting more bodies will be wasteful compared to 
recruiting and retain the right bodies. 
 
Cyberspace’s Challenge to the Peace of Westphalia 
The Peace of Westphalia established the principle that nations were sovereign 
within their own borders.  Other nations are prohibited from interference 
with another nation’s domestic affairs.  Under this system, a government has 
the obligation to suppress non-state actors from impacting the security of 
other nations.  To comply with the treaty, a functioning government has to 
raise a force that is more powerful than any potential rival within its borders.  
As noted above, governments today simply convert tax dollars into power 
armies.   
 
Unfortunately in cyberspace, a larger force of average cyber warriors may not 
be more effective than a few exceptional cyber warriors.  The problem is most 
acute for a small nation.  Even though a small country may be able to enforce 
law and order on the street, it is perfectly conceivable that a small number of 
                                                     
26 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), "Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)", 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36b4.html. 
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exceptional hackers could effectively out-compete a number of average 
government security officers in cyberspace.  If a nation cannot establish a 
monopoly of violence within its borders, we label it as a “failed state.”  The 
problem for the world order is how to handle a smaller nation that is a 
responsible member of the world order and yet a “failed state” in cyberspace.  
It is likely that many smaller nations may join forces to combat cyber 
warriors.  But what about the nations that both refuse to surrender their 
sovereignty and cannot control what occurs within their physical borders? 
 
Recommendations  
If cyber weapons do exhibit Power-Law randomness, then what are the 
actionable items?  Here are three possible initiatives: 
 
Recognize Military Structures Built on “Bell Curve” Assumptions 
The first step of change is to admit the existence of a problem.  How power is 
measured, how officers plan, and what is acceptable in warfare have all 
evolved from assumptions about an “average” soldier.  In cyberspace if these 
models only consider the average case, they will miss the most important 
features of the domain.  Understanding the Power-Law distributions and how 
frequently they occur in cyberspace should be an essential part of professional 
military education. 
 
Rethink How We Recruit, Reward, and Retain Cyber Forces 
The Power-Law randomness of cyber warfare puts the government in a 
similar position to a large publishing house.  As noted earlier, a publishing 
house cannot guarantee a larger market share by simply signing a larger 
number of average authors.  For a publishing house to stay profitable, it must 
do two things: effectively identify top performers and keep them happy.  
Currently recruiting in the military is primarily focused on numbers.  In 
cyberspace, the talent scout may be a more appropriate model.   
 
Currently, the American military uses an “up or out policy” with its existing 
personnel.  This is perfectly reasonable because keeping even the most 
talented operators in the weapon systems does not make a significant 
difference to the effectiveness of the force.  However, in cyberspace this policy 
is indefensible.  Moving or promoting the most gifted cyber warriors out of 
their job will mathematically make noticeable impact to the force.  Likewise, a 
rational compensation policy for cyber warriors will likely have the result of a 
commander making less than an exceptionally gifted operator. 
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The reader may be tempted to draw a comparison between the small number 
of Special Forces operators and the elite cyber forces.  The difference is that, 
in a physical conflict, the regular forces do the bulk of the combat.  In 
Cyberspace, the elite forces will have a much greater impact on the battlefield 
relative to their numbers.         
 
Design Strategies to Take Advantages of Power-Law Randomness  
The U.S. Air Force Standard Desktop Configuration is a classic example of a 
failure to understand the challenges of Power-Law randomness in cyberspace.  
The logic is to create and manage a single configuration that represents the 
most secure known way to build an average office machine.  This program 
may have saved costs, but it also created an enormous vulnerability.  This 
configuration may be highly resistant to a typical attack.  But by making the 
network so homogenous, if a weapon can work against one system, it is likely 
effective against all.  The challenge for the commander in the cyber world is to 
be prepared for the extreme attack.  The standard desktop may provide 
excellent resistance to the average weapon, but it is uniquely vulnerable to the 
exceptional.  Losses in the cyber world will occur in a more abrupt manner.  A 
wise commander will recognize that no amount of cost savings is worth 
creating a critical vulnerability that could fail at exactly the wrong moment.  
In a similar manner, successes will be more abrupt in the cyber world.  A 
successful commander will be prepared to capitalize on wild successes and 
take steps to limit wild failures. 
 
Conclusion 
Military commanders are trained to expect uncertainty.  When they commit 
to a course of action, they are taking a calculated risk.  This article has 
attempted to argue that a commander who brings assumptions from the 
physical world into cyber warfare is playing the wrong game.  Cyberspace is a 
land of extreme events.  Strategies that might be considered safe in physical 
warfare can be exceptionally dangerous in the cyber domain.  This is 
extremely counter-intuitive.  Cyberspace is the first war-fighting domain that 
is a wholly man-made creation.  As such, an observer might be tempted to 
think that it was designed.  In truth, cyberspace evolved.  The physical 
topology, the organizational topology, and the internal structures, all bear the 
signatures of countless small evolutionary changes.  This evolution is 
constant, rapid, and unforgiving.  As a result, entities in cyberspace display 
behaviors that are far from those to which military professionals are 
accustomed. 
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This article has argued that if the effectiveness of weapons in cyberspace 
follows a Power-Law distribution then there must be a change to cyber 
strategies.  If cyber weapons exhibit such a radically different behavior, the 
way militaries plan, recruit, and train their forces must necessarily change.  
Success on these battlefields will depend on people who can distinguish 
between those principles that have worked in the past and will still apply to 
cyberspace and those that will not. 
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